This edited collection by Baird and Rosenbaum collects some of the leading critics and proponents (at the time) of the use of animals in laboratories. While a nice introduction to some of the concerns of and central points of conflict, I felt that many of the texts were too brief to adequately wrestle the issues they raised. In fact, many of the chapters' authors made such statements in their writing, pointing out that because of the limited space, their arguments would necessarily have holes that they couldn't address as they did in their other writings. Overall, though, it is an interesting, if light on the meat (forgive the metaphor), read largely because it outlines where some of the major points of conflict lie in the debates, and some of the major philosophical approaches to animal welfare/rights.
Robert White's chapter is annoyingly reductive. It lists examples of humans that have been saved because of animal research, pausing a few times to say that he was thinking about writing this essay, before continuing to list. The overall statement is that the human lives are well-worth the cost. The rhetorical structure of listing is not only intended to pull on our heartstrings, but also to increase the emphasis of the lives saved. I actually think this is a smart strategy as its number discourages one from even asking the question "how many animals died for each person?" Or "how many animals die in laboratories that are not medical (e.g. cosmetics)?" Or " how many in science laboratories die in the pursuit of trivial or non-applicable knowledge that is not directly related to disease and human life?" There is no actual consideration of the numbers of individuals (human or nonhuman) involved, what makes a body and its concerns morally significant, etc. It also implies that one should feel particularly guilty for even considering a few animals lives are morally significant. In short, its pure emotional response with no intellectual reasoning. Grump.
Zak's chapter provides a useful explanation of why animal rights are needed and why we can't simply rely on virtue-based ethical approaches. While we can argue that it is demeaning to human character to be cruel to animals (virtue thought), it doesn't take into account the belief that animals have intrinsic value in and of themselves (rights thought). Also, contrary to how a lot of animal welfare/rights activists seem to argue about the similarities of animals and humans to justify our moral consideration, Zak argues that we should value their moral significance not only in spite of difference, but because of it. He notes "The orangutan cannot be redescribed as the octopus minus, or plus, this or that mental characteristic; conceptually, nothing could be added to or taken from the octopus that would make it the equivalent of the oriole. Likewise, animals are not simply rudimentary human beings, God's false steps made before He finally got it right with us" (27). To me, this strikes as an interesting challenge to Utilitarianism in some respects, but moreso to Midgley's contention that relative dismissal can allow us to rank and prioritize animals. If we value the life of each animal type for its difference instead of its similarity, we are no longer able to create a hierarchy based on capacities, the location of many of the current arguments (see the recent Law, Culture, and the Humanities special issue on Animals). The question of what to value and how much is removed, and instead we have to think about how we structure our connections and relations with them to create a mutually beneficial situation. He also provides a brief explanation of positive versus negative rights. For Zak, it is key to legislate animal rights because the law not only polices morality, but it reinforces and creates it. As long as animal rights are not legislated, animal activists will always be considered radical.
Richard Ryder's essay provides a basic explanation of the concept of speciesism - a form of discrimination based on one's species, akin to racism, sexism, etc. It is a concept used to fight against certain kinds of biological determinism in the sciences that justify animal suffering (and have justified human suffering in the past) on irrational grounds. Ryder also argues that animal experimentation is often done in the pursuit of trivial or unapplicable knowledge. He argues that knowledge is not always a positive or progressive thing. Knowledge for knowledge's sake should not be a justification for cruelty. He also notes that while we can claim knowledge is neutral, the funding behind it creates a "strong commercial motive" (41). Ultimately, "To attempt to justify certain suffering of animals against some future, as yet uncertain benefit, seems to be an unwarranted gamble. Furthermore, the suffering imposed upon a laboratory animalis quite deliberate and artifical, in the sense that if the experiment was not performed then the suffering would not occur; but the suffering that it is hoped to reduce by doing the experiment is caused either by natural illness or by self-inflicted risks (e.g., through the use of a new cosmetic) - in other words the speciesist attempts to justify the deliberate infliction of suffering upon an innocent animal by claiming that the knowledge so obtained may perhaps, somwhere at some unknown moment in the future, relieve the natural or self-inflicted pains of his own species" (41-2).
Wright's article does many things... His argument relies on the idea that sentience is the key capacity that makes animals worthy of moral consideration. For him, to argue language, rationality, and language give humans a dimension of suffering animals lack is to concede the point to animals because these capacities all emerge from sentience. They all magnify the suffering. The suffering still exists without them. Utilitarianism is an unsettling approach for Wright because of the countless forms of animal experimentation that would be perfectly justifiable under its calculus (pending how one weighs the suffering of which animals against the benefits for other humans and/or animals). Thus, rights might be where animal activists should turn. However, he points out the difficulties of rights. I would say he has a fairly contractarian understanding of rights - as a "non-aggression pact" signed by everyone who's allowed to for "mutual convenience" (50). The problem with bringing animals into the pact is that gaining access to rights has historically been a bloody and difficult affair. First, most pressure for rights has come from the oppressed group, usually with war, revolution, and violence, and animals are not in a position to accomplish this. Second, supporters of their causes have been able to empathize with how similar they were to the oppressed group, usually on the basis of their species as humans. Hence, liberatory humanist projects. The difficulty with animal rights doesn't come from logical moralism for Wright, but from practical moralism. Activists would have to sway so many people and change their ability to empathize. From this practical moralism perspective, the concept of speciesism - while perhaps an inelegant and logically flawed approach to rights (see Midgley) - has enormous persuasive power. In Midgley's terms, it presumes animals are already part of the group, and one would need merely to equalize their rights with the rest of the norm (humanity).
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