Midgley, Mary - Animals and Why They Matter

Midgley's book Animals and Why They Matter is an exploration of how and why our moral relationship to animals have been dismissed by major philosophers, scientists, and political activists. According to Midgley, animals can be dismissed absolutely and relatively. Absolute dismissal comes from the categorical refusal to consider animal claims as anything other than nonsensical. Relative dismissal "merely give[s] them a very low priority" compared to human claims. While many claim that moral consideration for our resource distribution and treatment should be based on nearness - what Midgley calls "the lifeboat model" (seen in either the reductionist us/them concentric circles or overlapping circles of values on p. 30) - she argues that while nearness is a real psychological factor, it alone should never be the deciding factor in how we treat animals. She is careful to not side too closely with rationalists or emotivist theories of morality. While rationalists dismiss emotional responses to moral issues as demonstrative of ignorance or insincerity, or as being inappropriate to the situation, emotivist theories of ethics support the perspectives that "morality altogether is nothing but the expression of emotion, or attitudes formed from it. Striking a middle ground between rationalist and emotivist theories, Midgley argues that responses to moral situations that are devoid of either rationality or emotion are wrong. Emotions are rightfully part of our response to moral issues but only when grounded in reasonable beliefs. The central chapters of the book chastize simplistic or "casual" readings of enlightenment philosophers' treatment of animals and morality, arguing that their discussions about the exact meanings of terms like rights, justice, and duty are often within the boundaries of a broader morality and animal examples are often used to clarify important points about the treatment of animals. That said, Midgley argues that the philosophers and scholars face a conceptual problems when trying to think about moral relations with animals. Symbolism is a powerful tool that has been used to denigrate women and colonial subjects. And terms like "equality" cannot remain vague to be used - both in terms of what equality, in relation to whom, and who is excluded from this equality. If equality is a term used to level treatment within a group, it is difficult to expand the size of the group at the same time. Putting traditional humanist enterprises in conflict with those concerned about animals when using equality as a framework to argue for rights and better treatment.


One of the more interesting aspects of this text is its close attention to how language is connected to forms of political activism and reform. She notes that Kant's attempt to define the term duty became less effective as a moral term in part due to everyday language practices that used the term differently. Her analysis of terms like liberty and equality is strongly reminiscent (perhaps prescient) of Michael McGee's theory of the ideograph. This attention to language allows her to make the insight that, while many philosophers now agree that animals deserve some kind of moral consideration, "the disagreement has so far focused mainly on the proper use of words like rights and equality rather than on defending traditional dismissive habits of thought and practice as a whole" (65). Curiously, though, rather than beginning to dismantle these intellectual methodologies and theoretical frameworks, Midgley's decision is that "we all need to clear up these concepts" - leaving the terms under which the argument about animals' claims for moral consideration under a traditionally humanist orientation (66).

After noting but not deeply exploring that both social claims (on behalf of individual animals) and ecological claims (on behalf of species, forests, etc.) seem to bear consideration, Midgley moves on to critique Utilitarian perspectives that preference of our own species is "nothing but a prejudice comparable to racism" (96). While she does not rely on distinctions between species to categorically dismiss their relevance, she notes that moves sweeping intellectual moves of this kind do a disservice to the animal rights/activist movement because it doesn't allow us to think through very real distinctions between species - the bee, wolf, bedbug, protozoa, etc. - and how they experience the world. However, she seems to prefer Singer's Utilitarianism over many others.

Finally, Midgley notes that claims about anthropomorphism - the projection of human qualities onto nonhuman beings - is often used to dismiss moral claims about animals. How can we get at their subjective experience, those who hold this perspective ask, if they are a different species? Midgley notes that this extreme form of skepticism - often associated with Behaviorist models - should also be extended to our interactions with other humans if taken seriously. However, that should not be our approach. While we might not be able to access and measure the inner experience of animals, that does not stop us inferring them from visible data. Emotions like anger are connected and displayed through behaviors. If this were not the case, Mahouts would regularly be killed by elephants because they wouldn't be able to tell they were angry. Yet, this is not the case.

Quotations:

"I shall argue throughout this book that the proper way to treat it [the idea that those nearest to us have special claims on those limited powers and resources] is to recognize nearness as a perfectly real and important factor in our psychology, and therefore in our morality, but to refuse to treat it as the sole or supreme one. We are subject to other claims. Nearness alone can never have a walkover." (21)

"There is obviously no simple formula for determining priority among these distinct kinds of claims [kinship, special need, justice, special responsibility, prudence, gratitude, admiration and wonder, fellowship], and moral philosophies like Utilitarianism which try to make the job look simple can only deceive us. Each culture, and each individual, must and does work out a map, a quite complex set of priciples for relating them." (30)

""Accordingly, anyone accused of being emotional about injustice or oppression or war or bad science or anything else can quite properly reply, 'Of course I feel strongly about this, and with good reason. It is a serious matter. Anyone who has no feeling about it, who does not mind about it, has got something wrong with him.' Strong feeling is fully appropriate to well-grounded belief on important subjects. Its absence would be a fault." (35)

"Obscure concept can often be used effectively for reform in this way, so long as they are employed only on issues where their practical bearing is clear." (63)